This paper reviews current status of the unified approach known as integrated safety assessment (ISA), as well as the associated SCAIS (simulation codes system for ISA) computer platform. These constitute a proposal, which is the result of collaborative action among the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN), University of Madrid (UPM), and NFQ Solutions S.L, aiming to allow independent regulatory verification of industry quantitative risk assessments. The content elaborates on discussions of the classical treatment of time in conventional probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) sequences and states important conclusions that can be used to avoid systematic and unacceptable underestimation of the failure exceedance frequencies. The unified ISA method meets this challenge by coupling deterministic and probabilistic mutual influences. The feasibility of the approach is illustrated with some examples of its application to a real size plant.
Introduction
The two traditional approaches to safety analysis in nuclear power plants are the so-called deterministic safety assessment (DSA) and the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). DSA continues to be the main support for licensing design issues. At post-TMI times, PSA started to be used as well in several licensing applications. The question of the consistency of deterministic and probabilistic studies was already posed in different licensing groups and reflected in the following issues: (1) to what extent and at which stage of the PSA a significant change in stand-by safety system initiation setpoints, with obvious impact on DSA, could be reflected in PSA; and (2) to what extent DSA and PSA covered different operator behaviors, including for instance time delays in manual actions. The Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) makes intensive use of PSA models in key aspects of its licensing day-to-day life, including inspections planning and categorization of their findings, incident analysis, and operational aspects (maintenance rule, human reliability, and safety culture). However, the operation is constrained by the conclusions of the analysis of the (automatic) design basis transients and accidents, (DSA), as reported in the safety assessments (SAR), which also include day-to-day requirements like those included in the operating technical specifications (OTS). The overall process encompasses widely different safety studies in nature, data, phenomena, and systems, each being a piece interacting in several ways with many others.
Ensuring consistency among implicit and explicit assumptions, interfaces, and conclusions is a major task of the regulatory review. The set of activities may be considered as a licensing validation and verification (V&V) process. Most regulatory activities are qualitative in nature, but the widespread use of computerized analysis also requires sophisticated, quantitative V&V with independent checks complementing the qualitative process. This paper summarizes some of the tools [simulation codes system for ISA (SCAIS)], methods [integrated safety assessment (ISA)], and results that have been (and are being) developed at CSN for this purpose, with special emphasis on the most recent ones. The main focus is on PSA related developments that may be classified according to the three main stages of a typical PSA, namely: (1) delineate the possible sequences of events (SOE), which amounts to finding all possible sequences of dynamic transitions (SOTs) resulting from the sequence of protective actions as well as possible failures of safety systems. No protective action takes place unless necessary conditions for it are fulfilled, most often consisting of process variables entering certain regions, situations that we call stimuli activations, such as alarms, procedure entry points, and/or crossing of deterministic setpoints. The set of transients activating stimulus here is called the stimulus domain; (2) determine system success criteria, discriminating among successful sequences of configurations of the safety systems (i.e., those in which the wrong trends of damage indicators are successfully corrected) from failed ones. The intersection of all stimuli domains of a sequence is the damage domain; and (3) compute, for each SOE, the frequency resulting from its safety systems configurations, by using, for instance, Fault-Tree/Event-Tree (FT/ET) techniques.
Although detailed methods and abundant works in the literature [1] provide guidance for Stage 3, such guidance becomes loose when describing Stages 1 and 2, mainly due to the unique phenomena involved in each application domain, their strong nonlinearities, and their dependence on the protection design methods, all of which are usually very sophisticated and technology dependent, as described in safety analyses reports (SAR) [2] . This paper addresses the feasibility of the ISA-SCAIS approach and, in addition, presents new ideas to handle important event timing and boundary condition uncertainty, allowing a dividing/synthesizing of the main ingredients of the accident progression.
2.
Integrated deterministic-probabilistic safety assessment methodologies Integrated deterministic-probabilistic safety assessment (IDPSA) is a family of methods that use a time-dependent phenomenological model of system evolution along with an analysis of system stochastic behavior to account for possible dependencies between failure events and dynamic processes [3] . The starting point of these frameworks is that safety justification must be based on the coupling of deterministic (consequences) and probabilistic (frequency) considerations to address mutual interactions between stochastic disturbances (e.g., failures of the equipment, human actions, and stochastic physical phenomena) and deterministic responses of the plant (i.e., transients). Thus it can be considered complementary to PSA and DSA approaches that intend to help in: (1) resolving time dependent interactions among physical phenomena, equipment failures, control logic, and operator actions in analysis of complex scenarios; (2) identification and characterization of a priori unknown vulnerable scenarios (sleeping threats) of the overall system; (3) consistent treatment of different sources of uncertainties; and (4) reduction of reliance on expert judgment and assumptions regarding complex time dependencies and scenarios.
The literature reports on a variety of methods, e.g., DYLAM, ADS-IDAC, MCDET, ADAPT, and GA-IDPSA; see [3e5] for further details.
As a drawback, these methods operate in the actual time/ state space and the computational effort is considerably larger compared with that required in a conventional event tree analysis. For this reason, application is still restricted to specific aspects of PSA or DSA. In order to considerably reduce the computation time for the numerous dynamic calculations, these methods generally treat continuous and discrete random transitions in a probabilistic way, through repeated branching of the sequence at systematically chosen points in time according to user specified probability distributions. ISA methodology lies within those methodologies.
3.
ISA-theory of stimulated dynamics methodology As indicated, ISA methodology tries to verify compliance with regulations and consistency in the design and safety assessments made by the industry. Consistent with this intent, ISA is an integrated method in which deterministic and probabilistic aspects of the safety problem are solved together, taking into account mutual dependencies.
The concept of a sequence as an ordered set of events is also extensively used in ISA. The ISA methodology strongly relies on simulation to determine the consequences of accident sequences. However, a sequence cannot be fitted to a particular time history. Treatment of sequence uncertainties and identification of failure domains are essential parts of ISA. If sequence success criteria are used, each simulated transient is evaluated against those criteria in order to find the failure domain. The concept of header success criteria is no longer needed because compliance with the sequence success criteria is a direct result of the simulation. This allows for the use of ISA as a powerful tool to verify the header success criteria used in Level 1 PSA.
The main basis of the ISA-TSD method (integrated safety assessment based on the theory of stimulated dynamics,
[6e8]) is to lower the assessment from the system configuration sequence level, characteristic of Level 1 PSA, or from the envelope level, characteristic of DSA, to the transient level within each sequence by: (1) considering sequences as large groups of transients accounting for all uncertainties compatible with the probability space under check, e.g., parameter uncertainty, initial conditions, variability in occurrence time of events and uncertainty in boundary conditions; (2) simulating a number of those sequence transients in order to find the sequence failure domain, defined as the subset of sequence transients in the probability space ending in a failed state. The number of transients that need to be simulated depends on the desired accuracy of the failure domain characterization but, in general, this number is very high; and (3) providing TSD algorithms to compute the contribution to the exceedance frequency (of the safety limit used to define the failed state) of any transient belonging to the failure domain, and then aggregating these contributions for all the transients there. Included as factors in those algorithms are the conditional probabilities of the safety system configurations characteristic of Level 1 PSA. Explicit consideration of stimuli ensures consistency of the set of safety measures included in every transient and allows for a proper classification of transients into dynamic sequences.
SCAIS
Leaving aside the theoretical aspects that inspired the detailed computational methods (TSD, [6e8]), ISA analysis involves a lot of transients, and its application thus requires a set of simulation/computational tools. The computerized platform called SCAIS has been developed for this main purpose. It is composed of a set of interconnected modules which, nevertheless, are their own entity and can be used as standalone tools or as modules of other methods as well. Present day SCAIS (see [7, 8] for its evolution) is the result of a consolidation and modernization program of the prior system. It is being developed in close collaboration with NFQ Solutions (Madrid, Spain), a software development company specializing in risk assessment. Also, the Technical University of Madrid (UPM) actively participates at the testing and application level.
As the focus of the ISA setup is in Discrete Dynamic Event Tree (DDET) transient simulation, most of the components of SCAIS are transient related, whereas a few others are probabilistic in nature. Fig. 1 presents a simplified scheme of the ISA-TSD methodology, whose blocks parallel the main components of SCAIS.
The "Automatic Generation of Paths/Sequences" block in Fig. 1 includes the following SCAIS elements [7, 8] : (1) BABIECA is the general simulation driver. It combines internal and external simulation modules from which the user can configure the plant model in the form of a topology of interconnected modules [9] . It takes care of the overall solution by controlling the transmission of information among modules, solving feedback loops if they exist and advancing the time step. These features provide great flexibility to build powerful plant simulation models; (2) DENDROS (Fig. 2) is the event scheduler that drives the dynamic generation and management of the different event sequences resulting from a given initiating event. It directs the simulation to perform the systematic traversal of all the possible branches, leading to different sequences. DENDROS then identifies and manages the branching points and, in certain cases, asks BABIECA to open new simulation processes, one for each possible outcome of the event (SIM in Fig. 2 ). The result is a dynamic event tree (DET); (3) PLANT MODEL is a particular user-defined combination of BABIECA modules able to simulate accident sequences. The variety of plant models that can be configured ranges from those using well accepted and validated external codes (MAAP, TRACE) to those composed only with internal BABIECA modules; (4) SIMPROC is a simulator of operating procedures that interacts with BABIECA to implement the operator actions requested by the procedures [10] . It is a special case of BABIECA external module because of the particularities of the interaction between plant and procedures.
These four SCAIS components implement the main dynamic modules as required by DET, also including those allowing for the verification of procedures via automatic pilot simulations. Other SCAIS components are the following. (5) The PROBABILITY CALCULATOR (ET/FT/APET block in Fig. 1 ) is actually a collection of methods and algorithms that provide probabilistic quantifications. It may be optionally called on to make estimates of the respective probabilities of the output branches of a branching point and to use them for elimination of some of these branches on the basis of low probability termination criteria. Its major role is the computation of exceedance frequencies in coordination with the RISK ASSESS-MENT module. (6) The PATH ANALYSIS MODULE (Fig. 1 ) performs detailed analysis of individual event tree sequences through the simulation of specific transients (paths) of the analyzed sequence. In coordination with DENDROS, the PATH ANALYSIS MODULE defines multiple simulation cases, i.e., sequence paths, by varying values of uncertain parameters and/or time delays (human actions or stochastic phenomena). The aim is to identify the sequence failure domain, given the applicable configuration sequence success criteria. (7) The SCAIS DATABASE is an SQL relational database (POSTGRES SQL) used as a repository for input and output information. Represented in the left-and right-hand side columns in Fig. 1 , it stores all the input data and results, allowing their easy postprocessing. The information stored in the database can be accessed off-line, making it possible to perform new analyses on the existing data without repeating the simulations unless necessary. (8) The RISK ASSESSMENT module, also shown in Fig. 1 , calculates the design barrier safety limit exceedance frequency, i.e., the frequency of the failed state, by integrating the TSD equations over the failure domain obtained from the PATH ANALYSIS MODULE, and considering the frequency density function obtained from the probability distributions evaluated in the PROBABILITY CALCULATOR.
All main components of SCAIS, including the simulator driver BABIECA and the event scheduler DENDROS, are designed with object oriented architecture and implemented in Cþþ language. In an attempt to make it platform independent, the whole SCAIS has been developed by CSN in collaboration with NFQ Solutions using open source standards (Linux, XercesC, libpqþþ).
Automatic generation of DETs is only possible with an adequate coordination between BABIECA and DENDROS, and sometimes, also coordinated with the PROBABILITY CALCU-LATOR. Fig. 2 illustrates the branching procedure implemented in SCAIS. For the sake of simplicity, only binary branching points are represented; these are points where the two output branches correspond to occurrence or not of an event. The upper part of Fig. 2 represents the opening of new simulation processes, whereas the lower part represents the corresponding dynamic event tree resulting from this procedure.
Branching criteria are represented by P i (P 1 , P 2 , etc.) in Fig. 2 . These criteria correspond to stimulus activations; the branching consists of simulating both the occurrence and the nonoccurrence of the event. When DENDROS detects that a branching criterion has been reached, it initiates the branching procedure, which can possibly be delayed by a time d if so specified in the branching rules: (1) DENDROS asks BABIECA to generate a restart file with the current status of the simulation; Fig. 2 e Overall BABIECA-DENDROS-probability calculator coordination. 
the existing simulation process continues with the "nominal" option (occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event, depending on the defined branching rules); and (2) DENDROS spawns a new simulation process, i.e., another instance of BABIECA, initializing the simulation model with the stored restart file and forcing the "alternative" option of the branching point. This procedure is recursively continued until every simulation process meets some predefined termination criterion.
5.
Recent activities. Summary of activities on the deterministic side 5.1.
ISA methods used for sequence delineation and quality of the set of design basis transients used in SARs (envelope issue)
PSA-DSA in the nuclear context is but another example of optimization of adequate protections and its verification. The main problem is to find envelopes of the evolution of damage indicators in piecewise sequences of successive changes in dynamics, (i.e., SOT), associated with protection actions. In general, the problem focuses on ensuring that the envelopes consider all the possible SOTs that may be involved in the accident progression and then cover, for each sequence, uncertainty in initial conditions and key data, as well as, most importantly, boundary conditions and protective action timing. These uncertainties easily explode the number of situations to consider, so that brute force techniques based on reproducing transients with best estimate simulations usually fail at reaching completeness of the situations considered to demonstrate the (umbrella) enveloping character. Fig. 3 deploys the strategy followed in the Spanish nuclear industry, as well as at CSN/modeling and simulation area (MOSI), to ensure that all relevant situations are covered, including the division in subproblems that accounts for the accident progression (APET, [8] ).
The SAR underground philosophy is consistent with that shown in Fig. 3 , but this approach uses the concept of "design basis transients/accidents" in order to cover all automatic action design situations. This implies the use of artificial events distorted both in assumptions and models, so that the timing of these analyses is also artificial. It is not simple to make an equivalence with the sequence delineation because of the different purpose. Any PSA invoking SARs should be aware that they provide no clue to answering important issues such as the available times embedded in the success criteria. Neither do they guarantee the sequence delineation, Stage 1, which requires extensive PSA additional analysis, based on safety functions, taking into account that out-of-design situations should also be considered, including operator actions.
Instead, the ISA-SCAIS verification method considers sequences as piecewise objects (1 piece for each interval between consecutive transitions) consisting of well identified groups of transients covering all uncertainties explicitly, including times of actions and dynamic model boundary conditions as functions of time. The design domain is clearly distinguished from the general risk domain.
References [7, 8] detail tools and methods and provide several examples describing the ISA-SCAIS V&V approach for internal consistency of the deterministic analysis and the verification of the sequence delineation, that is, Stage 1. The method proposes the use of surrogate models to analyze the sequences, models fed from the deterministic analysis. When considering the deterministiceprobabilistic consistency of Stages 2 and 3, the approach ends up in the generation of a SCAIS database with an adequate, best estimate set of representative transients and the corresponding identification of dynamic surrogate models. These surrogate models consistently carry the deterministic connection while allowing for fast simulation of a myriad of transients, each stimulus variable having a different surrogate model that projects the influence of the rest of the system.
5.2.
Verification of emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines When verification of an emergency procedure (EOP) for scenarios without core melt is the issue, simulations are run with an automatic pilot version of the procedures, as realistically as possible, using the procedure simulator SIMPROC [10] coupled to the automatic event tree SCAIS simulator. Timing to take the actions is predetermined using information from best practices and as operator crew task action studies indicate. The objectives of the procedure should be met and success relative to any of the safety limits should be assured. If this is not the case, the procedure is questioned at specific points. Examples are given in [11] . These examples are part of the automatic sequence delineation verification of Stage 1.
Concerning severe accident management guidelines (SAMGS), as a postFukushima starting activity, MOSI engaged in Fig. 3 e Strategy to ensure that all safety relevant situations are covered.
N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 2 9 5 e3 0 5 methods to obtain useful insight into severe accident scenarios typified by blackouts (SBO). As a preliminary exercise, the SCAIS platform, using its MAAP system module, was used to analyze a sequence initiated by loss of both off-site and on-site AC power [emergency diesel generators (EDG)] in a three loop Pressurized Water Reactor Westinghouse design (see [12] ). The set of actions is depicted in Fig. 4 , which identifies the EOPs and SAMGs involved. Five damage indicators have been considered in the analysis:(1) core uncover; (2) core exit temperature (CET > 648.86 C); (3) peak cladding temperature (PCT > 1203.85 C); (4) fuel relocation into lower plenum; and (5) reactor pressure vessel (RPV) failure. Fig. 5 shows the damage domains for the same sequence obtained when considering the uncertain times of failure of the continuous, and of recovery of the alternate, current electric supply. A total of 900 simulations were run, each providing information on one of the (uncertain) time combination points in Fig. 5. 
6.
Recent activities. Summary of developments and applications in classical probabilistic issues
Incident analysis
CSN/MOSI has direct responsibility in executing CSN incident analysis on a routine basis using a customized, classical FT/ET method in order to rank incident severity and to classify incidents as precursors of more severe situations.
Precursor analyses [13] are performed in the framework of the Incident Revision Panel (IRP). The IRP is a crossdisciplinary group that discusses, reviews, and classifies every incident reported by the Spanish Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) to CSN. Within this group, precursor analyses are requested to obtain a measure of the risk impact associated with an incident and to obtain a probabilistic criterion as an input to the classification. An incident with a risk measure [conditional core damage probability (CCDP)] > 10 À6 is a precursor; an incident with a CCDP > 10 À5 is a significant precursor, and is then classified as a significant event. Insights from precursor analyses are discussed within this group. This area of precursor activity has evolved in scope over the years (also covering significance determination of inspection findings), as has MOSI involvement as more PSA models have become available. Some overall results are presented in Figs. 6 and 7.
6.2.
Probabilistic consistency across different plants.
Verifying classical FT quantifications
The accumulated MOSI experience in FT/ET quantification of Spanish plants with industry PSA models includes use of, and knowledge regarding, different computational platforms (substantially Risk Spectrum and CAFTA), and different modeling cultures at the different plants. As exemplified in the cases of precursors and significance determination of inspection findings, intercomparison between results in different contexts is essential to better understand the risk profiles of plants. However, sometimes doubts appear regarding whether or not the same problem will yield similar results in different environments. In view of this, MOSI, in cooperation with the CSN PSA licensing branch, initiated an important harmonization activity. It was based on the use of tools (where they existed, and on internal development where they did not), to translate different modeling formats into a unified XML language (open PSA initiative) [14] . Additionally, tools were also used/developed to translate the unified XML input files back into either computing environment. In addition, research projects were launched to verify the efficiency of the computations by comparison with alternate ET/FT approaches. Among these approaches, binary decision diagrams (BDD) constitute a popular alternative; one of the projects [15] used them for this purpose.
Furthermore, as regulators, CSN staff members need independent views of licensee models, which calls for in-house made models. This harmonization activity also needs to abstract different modeling techniques and diverse hypotheses that are not intrinsic to and therefore not part of the risk profile. In view of this and within the framework of these harmonization activities, CSN has initiated also a standardization activity to bring together PSA hypotheses and modeling 
techniques from different Spanish NPP PSA models. The SPAR (standardized plants analysis risk) concept, taken from the approach followed by United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in its regulatory system, is being studied and analyzed by CSN in collaboration with UPM, with the aim of attaining a standard modeling framework and overcoming the problems and drawbacks that have appeared in the application of Integrated Nuclear Power Plant Supervision System (SISC) during these past years. The strategy followed is based on a comparison of current PSAs of similar Spanish NPPs; it is implemented in order to collect, identify, and agree on which characteristics, hypothesis, and modeling approaches (both at the ET and the FT levels) are most adequate and convenient for SISC purposes, and to propose a standard for in-house modeling (see [16] ).
7.
Other current developments 7.1.
ISA-TSD off-line prototype
The ISA-TSD framework has a deterministic aspect, i.e., finding the damage (failure) domains, and a probabilistic one, i.e., finding its frequency. The SCAIS transient simulation Sequence data= paths, stimulus, parameters, and probability Path data= stimulus, parameters, and probability Fig. 8 e Structural block diagram of the off-line TSD prototype.
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techniques described above do not include any strategy to optimize the branching approach of the DET to minimize the number of runs needed to identify the so-called damage domains, defined as the locus of failed transients and differing only in terms of specified features characteristic of the uncertainty problem. ISA-TSD extends the classical uncertainty methods (which mostly refer to parameters) to uncertainty of the timing of events, including envelopes of initial conditions, and the boundary condition uncertainty. Fig. 8 shows the structure of a first off-line TSD prototype implementing the search of damage/failure domains and the computation of the exceedance frequency. With this prototype, each research item can be tested off-line before its integration into SCAIS, which is then used as a developmental tool for testing ISA/SCAIS improvements. To show the unified character of the tools, prototype performance has been used under some challenging situations, such as the impact on the containment of an inflow of hydrogen and steam as a PSA2 subproblem, resulting from a severe accident medium size Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and in a completely different case consisting of a plant transient analysis (SAR type) in an experimental facility.
It is easy to distinguish, in Fig. 8 , circles dealing with single transients (paths) from those related to the overall strategy, i.e., selection of paths and identification of failure domains. Several search methods have been proposed and tested. Concerning transient treatment, the "simulate path" action shown in Fig. 8 is performed with the help of models suitable for finding reasonable envelopes (adequate models). These models may be found in many ways (from Best Estimate (BE) to simplified or parametric models).
Transmission functions theory and TSD approach
The ISA TSD method requires adequate dynamic models that are able to find reasonable envelopes for any subproblem describing accident progression phases in different areas of the plant. However, best estimate codes are too large and complex to be used directly, and finding adequate models for each subproblem is hard, and the resulting models are difficult to validate, especially when considering the widely different phenomena involved in the various subproblems. CSN-MOSI is working on a new approach to tackle this problem. N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 2 9 5 e3 0 5
As the safety variables of interest are not that numerous, the idea is to use the BE multi-process-variable codes to identify and feed envelope surrogate dynamic, models that are adequate to project and envelope the BE result on any preselected single process-variable. The single process variable surrogate models are dynamic models based on piecewise linear approximations; these models have the same mathematical structure in all cases. Very fast and efficient algorithms allow the running of the very many transients required to construct the timing and boundary condition envelopes. The basis for the dynamic surrogate models is transmission functions theory (TFT) ( [8, 17] ). Fig. 9 and Eq. (1) depict the approach schematically.
ISA road map development
Some research objectives that are foreseen within ISA-TSD-SCAIS development are the following: (1) future activities will continue to consolidate, optimize, and gain more experience in the specific approach followed, including implementation of regular PSA quantification methods and tools within SCAIS computer platform. The aim is to implement current NPP Fault Trees models and generation of CSN standardized PSA models (such as the USNRC SPAR models) of Spanish plants that may be quality graded; (2) different research aspects devoted to improving and optimizing the use of dynamic surrogate models based on TFT within ISA-TSD methodology. Some examples are the following: explore the definition of several useful figures of merit to synthesize results of PSA dynamic assessments; e.g., header-importance indices that characterize header dynamic efficiency (i.e., the actual protective or degrading function of the header); development of transmission function (FT) identification techniques based on database (BE code or experimental results); application to estimates of source terms in PSA2, in a manner similar to that in which the USNRC representative PSA2 study [18] estimates the uncertainty bands for the release of the most important families of radio-nuclides; (3) within the more general integrated deterministic probabilistic safety assessment (IDPSA) techniques being developed worldwide [3, 4], some research activities have been foreseen: equip SCAIS with adequate data mining and classification techniques [19] , which would help to establish lossless extraction and condensation of useful information amenable to expert evaluation. Here again TFT could play a relevant role; and (4) further applications of the method [12,20e23] are still required. In particular, the ISA/SCAIS approach has interesting and direct applicability to the verification of SAMGs and EDMGs [12, 24] .
Conclusion
Quantitative V&V activities at regulatory bodies are complementary of their qualitative reviews, and are essential in view of the ubiquity of computerized analysis included in the industry safety cases. Among the many issues involved, consistency checks are of primary importance. They require specific developments of independent tools and methods.
In particular, these checks should be performed when they refer to issues of probabilistic versus deterministic aspects that involve very difficult problems, so as to verify the success criteria and to discriminate when those criteria should be consistently modified in PSA applications. For instance, relaxation of OTS (operating technical specifications), justified on the basis of FT/ET computations, should not be accepted without ensuring first that the FT/ET success criteria do not require consistent modification.
Part of the efforts made at CSN to develop diagnostic tools and methods for this purpose were briefly described, focusing on the success criteria and internal consistency of the probabilistic side. This helps a great deal in technically objective regulatory decision-making because consistency of probabilistic and deterministic aspects can be better addressed.
This document has elaborated on: (1) the steps taken in the development of the integrated safety assessment (ISA) methodology and its associated software package (SCAIS); (2) recent applications of methods and tools that illustrate its potential to verify the consistency of deterministic and probabilistic licensing safety cases; and (3) further areas of development that are foreseen.
